Benjamin Jarvis

"(Adapted from the Introductory Chapter)

The Rules of Thought covers a number of topics that span across the philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the methodology of philosophy. Our principal motivating reason for treating these topics together is to provide an explicative defense of philosophical anti-exceptionalism. Roughly speaking, this is the view that good philosophical inquiry is continuous with good inquiry construed more broadly. The idea is that good philosophical inquiry draws on the same cognitive resources as, for instance, good quotidian inquiry, and that inquiry that is “philosophical” does not comprise a sui generis kind.

An explicative defense of philosophical anti-exceptionalism is constructive; it requires showing how good philosophical inquiry is continuous with good inquiry construed broadly. Our showing how will proceed in two steps. The first step will be developing a theory of what good inquiry of the most relevant sort is. The second step will be using this theory in order to demonstrate how philosophical inquiry can simply be an instance of this sort when it is carried out properly. (We will also suggest other ways in which good philosophical inquiry is continuous with good inquiry construed more broadly.)

The first step takes place in Part I. Our claim is that good inquiry of the most relevant sort is pure rational thinking, so the task of Part I will be to elaborate what pure rational thinking is. Pure rational thinking is rational thinking that is intimately tied to the capacity for thought. Thus, in elaborating on pure rational thinking, we will simultaneously be explaining at least some aspects of the essential nature of a particular kind of thought, namely propositional attitudes. We propose that thinking specifically of the sort that involves propositional attitudes—has constitutive rules. A subject must be governed by these rules—even if not particularly well—in order to have propositional attitudes. At least some of these rules of rationality coincide with conclusive rational relations—entailment relations of a particular normatively-loaded variety—between propositions. Consequently, these conclusive rational relations play a role in individuating propositional attitudes—in this respect, they are the (normative) “rules of thought.” When cognition proceeds with sensitivity to these conclusive rational relations, the subject engages in pure rational thinking. Although our discussion in Part I is situated in the context of a broader explicative defense of philosophical anti-exceptionalism, we consider this discussion to be independently motivated by issues that arise from thinking about propositional attitudes themselves.

The second step takes place in Part II. There we will show that the epistemology of philosophical inquiry need draw only on the resources developed in Part I. As a secondary aim, we will attempt to vindicate philosophical traditionalism understood as the claim that philosophical inquiry is, in certain canonical cases, a priori inquiry into the essential natures of objects, properties, and relations that proceeds by, for instance, the consideration of thought experiments. Consequently, we will spend some time in Part II developing a theory of the a priori in order to show that it is a consequence of this theory that certain modal knowledge of interest to philosophers is a priori knowledge. The positive side of our explicative defense of philosophical anti-exceptionalism ends with Part II.

The supplementary negative side of our project begins in Part III. The principal aim of Part III is to undermine experiential rationalism. According to this thesis, intuitions play an especially central role in the epistemology of philosophy (or the a priori considered more broadly). For example, a philosopher who posited a sui generis faculty of “rational intuition,” and argued that this faculty played a central role in the epistemology of philosophy appears to embrace such a view. So does any other philosopher who thinks that all or most philosophical evidence consists in claims about intuitions, or thinks that intuitions play a role in philosophical investigation analogous to the role perceptual experience plays in empirical investigation. To the extent that experiential rationalists are not innocently confusing their form of rationalism with ours (wherein intuitions have no significant epistemic role), we contend that they are engaging in obscurantism that mystifies philosophical inquiry. Indeed, experiential rationalism is difficult to reconcile with philosophical anti-exceptionalism—although perhaps that is because it is simply not a viable epistemology.

From our perspective, it is important to distinguish experiential rationalism from our view in order to deflect any criticism from, for instance, “negative experimental philosophy” (i.e. experimental philosophy aimed at revising traditional philosophical methods). However, we suggest that the problems of experiential rationalism afflict a variety of alternative views as well. This point further substantiates the positive picture of Parts I and II. Our theory of cognition turns out to be preferable because it better accommodates the intersubjective validity and objectivity of rational inquiry than do the theories of many of our rivals."

One of the deepest ideological divides in contemporary epistemology concerns the relative importance of belief versus credence. Traditional epistemology, which maintains the theoretical prominence of belief, faces a serious problem if—as some Bayesian epistemologists contend—rational decision making cannot be explained without making reference to rational credence, particularly in cases with abnormal payoff structures. The principal project of this paper is to present a novel way of defusing this problem. We suggest that, in these cases, rational decision-making might draw not on credences, but, rather, other doxastic attitudes—genuine representations that differ in strength from belief. Moreover, whether to hold these different doxastic representations can often be determined on the basis of one’s beliefs. So, in practice, belief without credence might well be enough to account for rational decision-making across a wide range of cases.

The topic of this paper is the relationship between epistemology and radically extended cognition.  Radically extended cognition (REC)—as advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998)—is cognition that is partly located outside the biological boundaries of a cognizing subject.  Recently, philosophers have argued that REC is actual;  however, even critics allow that REC is at least possible.  Epistemologists have now begun to wonder whether REC has any consequences for theories of knowledge.  For instance while Pritchard (2010) suggests that REC might have implications for which virtue epistemology is acceptable, Carter (2013) wonders whether REC threatens anti-luck epistemology.  In this paper, I argue that the possibility of REC has no systematic consequences for theorizing in epistemology.  I illustrate my point by considering the discussion of Pritchard (2010) and Carter (2013).  I suggest an alternative relationship between epistemology and REC: epistemology can play a role in diagnosing cases of REC.  By establishing that entities partially located outside biological boundaries play certain epistemic roles, one can establish that they play cognitive roles as well.  Similarly, by establishing that entities partially located outside biological boundaries don't play certain epistemic roles, one can establish that they don't play the related cognitive roles either.  I conclude the paper by illustrating this last point.

In this paper, I recommend a creature-level theory of representing.  On this theory, a creature (basically) represents some entity just in case the creature adapts its behavior to that entity.  Adapting is analyzed in terms of establishing new patterns of behavior.  The theory of representing as adapting is contrasted with traditional causal and informational theories of mental representation.  Moreover, I examine the theory in light of Putnam-Burge style externalism; I show that Putnam-Burge style externalism follows from and is explained by it.  I also suggest that the theory of representing as adapting easily accommodates a significant causal-explanatory role for (wide) representational content.

According to proponents of radically extended cognition, cognition is located outside the boundaries of biological organisms.  In this paper, I offer a new argument for a modest version of this view according to which cognitive processes are radically extended.  I do so by showing that features of a subject’s environment—in particular, the pen and paper that a subject uses to solve complex mathematical problems—can have epistemic roles that are indicative of cognitive roles.  I end the paper by discussing how epistemology might play a significant role in diagnosing alleged cases of radically extended cognition.

According to deflationism, truth has no substantial nature. In contrast, Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch have argued that truth has a normative nature, and, moreover, if it is has a normative nature, it must have a further underlying substantial nature capable of explaining this normative nature. In this paper, I argue for the plausibility of an alternative: that truth has a normative nature without having any further underlying substantial nature. Thus, while I contend for a “maniacal” pluralism about the underlying truth-constituting properties of truth- bearers that is consonant with deflationism, I suggest truth may have a normative nature nonetheless. Furthermore, in arguing for the plausibility of this, the dual aspects theory of truth, I simultaneously advocate for cognitive particularism, the view that the fundamental explanations for cognitive norms are particular to the content-types of belief rather than stemming, more generally, from the nature of belief and truth alone.

This paper defends the view that knowledge is type identical to cognitive achievement. I argue, pace Duncan Pritchard, that not only knowledge, but cognitive achievement is incompatible with environmental luck. I show that the performance of cognitive abilities in environmental luck cases does not distinguish them from non-abilities per se. For this reason, although the cognitive abilities of the subject are exercised in environmental luck cases, they are not manifested in any relevant sense. I conclude by showing that this explanation is not ad hoc as it can be generalized to apply to causal features besides cognitive abilities.

More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role or directly follow from the theory of mental content.  In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided.  Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these norms are not problematic in the way critics have suggested they would be.  In particular, these norms do not guide thinking by motivating intentional agents to (intentionally) accord with them; as a result, no obvious vicious regress threatens the theory.  In the final section of this paper, I argue that accepting this teleological theory of intentionality need not commit one to thinking that intentionality is the product of natural selection.

What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments of ordinary counterfactuals. On this view, the intuition  is naturalistically innocuous, but it has a contingent content and  could be known at best a posteriori. We suggest an alternative to Williamson’s account, according to which we apprehend  thought-experiment intuitions through our grasp on truth in fiction. On our view, intuitions like the Gettier intuition are necessarily true and knowable a priori. Our view, like Williamson’s, avoids naturalistic skepticism.

How do we know what’s (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemology. When we discover what is possible or what is impossible, we generally exploit important connections between what is possible and what we can coherently imagine. We can often come to knowledge of metaphysical modality a priori.

We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.

In this paper, I argue that it is not a distinguishing mark of radically extended cognition that external entities play an active role in cognition.  I do so by developing a version of Putnam-Burge anti-individualism whereon represented external entities also play an active role in cognition.

How should we understand good philosophical inquiry? Ernest Sosa has argued that the key to answering this question lies with virtue-based epistemology. According to virtue-based epistemology, competences are prior to epistemic justification. More precisely, a subject is justified in having some type of belief only because she could have a belief of that type by exercising her competences. Virtue epistemology is well positioned to explain why, in forming false philosophical beliefs, agents are often less rational than it is possible to be. These false philosophical beliefs are unjustified—and the agent is thereby less rational for having them—precisely because these beliefs could not be formed by exercising competences. But, virtue epistemology is not well positioned to explain why, in failing to form some true philosophical beliefs, agents are less rational than it is possible to be. In cases where agents fall short by failing to believe philosophical truths, the problem is not that they have unjustified beliefs, but that they lack justified ones. We argue that Timothy Williamson's recent critique of the a priori/a posteriori distinction falls prey to similar problem cases. Williamson fails to see that a type of belief might be a priori justified if and only if, even without any special confirming experiences, agents fall short by failing to have this type of belief. We conclude that there are types of beliefs that are deeply a priori justified for any agent regardless of what epistemic competences the agent has. However, we also point out that this view has a problem of its own: it appears to make the acquisition of a priori knowledge too easy. We end by suggesting that a move back towards virtue-based epistemology is necessary.  But in order for this move to be effective, epistemic competences will have to be understood very differently than in the reliabilist tradition.

The aim of this paper is to show how knowledge can have both an evaluative and normative role in inquiry.  It is suggested that whether believing methods are good turns precisely on whether they make knowledge possible.  This fact can be used to explain why having the aim of believing truly and not believing falsely is equivalent to being committed to only believe when believing is a possible way of knowing.  We end by explaining why inquiring subjects might also incur the strictly stronger commitment to only believe when they know.